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The neuroscience of storing and molding tool action 
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Choosing how to use tools to accomplish a task is a natural and seemingly trivial aspect of 
our lives, yet engages complex neural mechanisms. Recently, work in healthy populations has 
led to the idea that tool knowledge is grounded to allow for appropriate recall based on some 
level of personal history. This grounding has presumed neural loci for tool use, centered on 
parieto-temporo-frontal areas to fuse perception and action representations into one dynamic 
system. A challenge for this idea is related to one of its great benefits. For such a system to 
exist, it must be very plastic, to allow for the introduction of novel tools or concepts of tool use 
and modification of existing ones. Thus, learning new tool usage (familiar tools in new situations 
and new tools in familiar situations) must involve mapping into this grounded network while 
maintaining existing rules for tool usage. This plasticity may present a challenging breadth of 
encoding that needs to be optimally stored and accessed. The aim of this work is to explore 
the challenges of plasticity related to changing or incorporating representations of tool action 
within the theory of grounded cognition and propose a modular model of tool–object goal related 
accomplishment. While considering the neuroscience evidence for this approach, we will focus 
on the requisite plasticity for this system. Further, we will highlight challenges for flexibility and 
organization of already grounded tool actions and provide thoughts on future research to better 
evaluate mechanisms of encoding in the theory of grounded cognition.
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Grounded CoGnition relevant to tool use
An idea that is being pursued is that acts relevant to tool use are 
grounded, where tool knowledge is grounded based on past acts. 
Thus, hammer does not come with an operant functional defini-
tion, but more precisely is based on how we have used a hammer 
in our lives. This will “ground” a representation of the tool in a 
state that encodes usage. Of use is also to note that this grounding 
may differ from person to person, although possibly in subtle ways. 
For example, the two co-authors of this work have slightly distinct 
histories of a hammer in multiple obvious and atypical contexts. 
Further, actions can become encoded deeper in context, based on 
situational rules and tendencies. For example, occasionally a spoon 
is more likely/useful than a plastic stirrer for coffee (more will fol-
low of this example). The act of stirring coffee is grounded with 
multiple potential items based on typical contexts.
Basic aspects of tools and objects have a clear foundation, mak-
ing the idea of grounding tool use attractive. Related to grounded 
views of tool usage, vital work in this field was performed that dem-
onstrated how objects and actions are coupled based on perception 
of how the object is held (Tucker and Ellis, 1998). Such an idea has 
been advanced by suggesting that seen objects can activate motor 
representations as a result of functional knowledge of the seen 
object (Anderson et al., 2002). Many other studies have established 
this important idea (Grezes et al., 2003; Handy et al., 2003; Tucker 
and Ellis, 2004; Rice et al., 2007). A strong basis for the argument 
of grounded cognition in tool and object-related action is seen in 
introduCtion
The theory of grounded cognition has offered a fascinating window 
into mechanisms of storage and recall of concepts. Generally, the act 
of simulation of past events is an important aspect of current theo-
ries of grounded cognition (Decety and Grezes, 2006). For a given 
object-related interaction, information from the modal senses for 
perception (e.g., vision, somatosensation), action (e.g., kinethesis, 
proprioception), and introspection (e.g., affect), are blended into a 
representation of that experience (Barsalou, 2008). As knowledge is 
needed to later represent that object, this multimodal information 
(perception, action, introspection) is recalled to simulate the brain 
states associated with that object (Barsalou, 2008). Through this 
process, both cognitive and motoric functions can take advantage 
of the ideas offered by this theory. Here, we will focus on a specific 
aspect of motoric function: implementing tools and objects in vari-
ous actions. For the purposes of this work, we will use the word 
“tool” to define non-animate artifacts that operate on something 
by a user (e.g., spoon). “Object” will be that which is operated on 
by a tool (e.g., mug). “Action” will generally involve mutual use of 
the tool and object to accomplish a goal (e.g., stir coffee). We will 
go further to differentiate knowledge of tool manipulation from 
knowledge of tool function, where manipulation is “how” to use 
a tool and function is “why” to use a tool (Buxbaum et al., 2000). 
Some of the principles presented can be applicable for many types 
of movements, such as communicative gesture, but we are limiting 
the scope of this to tool use alone.
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 action–observation related networks. Yet, the recognition of both 
classes of tools falls outside of the suggested tool-related network 
for knowledge (that codes recognition and action). Similarly, others 
have recently shown that prefrontal and mediotemporal areas of 
the left hemisphere are important for understanding the use of a 
new tool (Menz et al., 2010).
Although the exact length of time required for a tool or object 
to become grounded is unknown, we can look to the motor con-
trol and learning literature for insight. It is well known that motor 
learning in humans occurs in three distinct phases: Initial stage, 
where trial-and-error is required to establish new sensory infor-
mation with correct motor commands (e.g., derivation of a novel 
sensorimotor association); Intermediate stage, where the newly 
acquired sensorimotor association is learned through practice (e.g., 
consolidation of the sensorimotor map); Advanced stage, where 
the working memory access of the sensorimotor association is no 
longer required and movements can be performed with less reli-
ance on sensory feedback processing and attention (Halsband and 
Lange, 2006). These stages of learning, although variable, begin 
immediately and may continue to develop for days to weeks (Karni 
et al., 1998), at which point the skill is retained (Karni and Sagi, 
1993). Some interesting work suggests that, in humans, develop-
ment of tool-specific functional knowledge and skilled usage (for 
previously non-tool objects) occurs within the first training ses-
sion and continues over successive sessions (Weisberg et al., 2007). 
However, at which stage an object becomes grounded as a tool 
remains an open question.
Clearly, sensorimotor knowledge is gained (albeit in a limited 
degree) in rarely used tools and one might presume that it became 
grounded. One could argue that the process of grounding the tool 
was “incomplete” for the rarely used tools, as action encoding and 
grounding seems to reflect left parietofrontal activation (Buxbaum 
and Kalenine, 2010). Though, if unfamiliar or very rarely used tools 
are not grounded and activate temporo-occipital regions, perhaps 
this is a site of initial storage of new/atypical tools before grounded 
in a sensorimotor experience. Here, a storage area is defined that 
represents an object that remains low level (perhaps visual) and 
shares some tool features, while a clear tool/action representation 
(left parietofrontal) has yet to be defined. This effect was seen in 
the study of Weisberg et al. (2007) on training the use of novel tools 
in actions. This study nicely demonstrated that before training, 
object–action matching for novel tools generated activity limited 
to occipital cortex followed by left temporo-parieto-frontal areas 
after training.
The spirit of this theory is seen in studies of recognition of visu-
ally presented objects. A study demonstrated that the occipitotem-
poral areas (lateral occipital–posterior fusiform) process recognized 
pictures with more activity than non-recognized images (Grill-
Spector et al., 2000). Further, a more concise review demonstrates 
that such areas do not only respond to presence of stimuli, but to 
our perception of the stimuli (Grill-Spector and Malach, 2004). This 
garners some speculation that our perception (perhaps including 
familiarity, environment, etc…) may affect the meaningful process-
ing of a tool or object (Lin et al., 2008). Similarly, activity within 
primary visual cortex can be modulated by crossmodal sensory 
processing during visual–auditory illusion (Watkins et al., 2006) 
and in the visual–tactile domain (Ramos-Estebanez et al., 2007), 
a review by Grafton (2009) which clearly illustrates that action can 
be recognized using a system where subjects can effectively match 
seen actions with their own representations for action understand-
ing (Grafton, 2009). Further, theories have been well proposed to 
suggest how vision and action knowledge are integrated to allow 
for the fusing of perception and action (Buxbaum and Kalenine, 
2010). Similar ideas are given in the context of action. It is plausible 
that a key basis for our ability to act based on prior experiences 
through simulation (Barsalou, 1999). Here, we can recall our prior 
experiences and apply them as we are carrying out an act (Barsalou, 
2008). A similar mechanism can be used when we have to represent 
a seen action, by recalling the states of the observer in tool use 
(Kellenbach et al., 2003; Jarvelainen et al., 2004), object grasping 
(Pierno et al., 2009; Valyear and Culham, 2010), and action (Frey 
and Gerry, 2006; Evangeliou et al., 2009) studies.
a Potential limitation? – “PlastiCity” of Grounded 
CoGnition
While grounded cognition is attractive for the ideas above, a com-
mon thread is that sensorimotor experience drives this process for 
tools/object action knowledge. However, two aspects of this theory 
should be addressed related to this idea of how we actually ground 
tool/object/action knowledge.
First, what if we have limited or no prior experience with a tool? 
How well is it grounded? The recall of a familiar tool (e.g., ham-
mer) for action or recognition is clearly left parietofrontal involved 
(Lewis, 2006). However, there is suggestion that tool representations 
differ based on our relative history with a tool (Vingerhoets et al., 
2009). Our questions regarding grounded cognition come in con-
sideration of the process and neural architecture used to encode a 
tool/object representation, then how this grounded representation 
may change over time, particularly to contract into a limited-use 
tool representation.
To our second question, how can a grounded tool/object/action 
be modified? As another example, how might we come to the idea 
that a hammer can be used to re-seal a paint can (without any 
sensorimotor experience of this), when we likely first learned it as 
an implement to drive in a nail? Similar examples are provided in 
other work, where grounded views may result in a need to break out 
of “functional fixedness” on a regular basis (Wilson, 2002). Thus, 
we focus on the idea of the “plasticity of grounded cognition.” That 
is, how do these parietofrontal tool–object representations develop, 
grow, and change over time based on our experiences and creativity? 
Further, what is the neuroscience of this process? As will be seen, 
these two questions are not fully segregated from each other.
Creation/maturation of a Grounded rePresentation
In consideration of the first question (progression of novel tool/
object/action representations), the study of Vingerhoets (2008) 
offers an intriguing point. Here, unlike familiar tools, recognition 
of unfamiliar and rarely used tools heavily engages left temporo-
occipital areas. As unfamiliar tools natively have no clear action 
(specifically sensorimotor) representation, this will clearly pre-
vent simulation-based action knowledge, and should fail to gen-
erate clear action–observation knowledge related to such tools (as 
in Grafton, 2009). However, rarely used tools likely would have 
some limited action (sensorimotor) knowledge, and may engage 
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be used that bear some similarity to the necessary tool. The issue 
of tools being grounded based on prior action history does not 
preclude one from using them apart from their intended purpose. 
Though, certain tools may be favored. The handle of a hammer 
could be used to stir paint, though this might make latter use of the 
hammer more difficult. An alternative may be a disposable pencil 
to accomplish the same task. The important fact is that neither the 
pencil nor the hammer was grounded for stirring a can of paint.
This issue bears similarities to ideas proposed in the study of 
retaining and recalling motor memories, based on our ability to 
store, recall, and modifying motor plans for varying environmental 
contexts. One theory, MOSAIC (modular selection and identifica-
tion for control), takes into account our ability to operate in the 
world in multivariate environments (Wolpert and Kawato, 1998). 
Interestingly, this work introduces the idea of object use to pro-
mote how behavior depends on many internal and external vari-
ables. Hence, we are not scripted to perform movements only in 
the state that we learned the movement (e.g., only moving a full 
can from a neutral arm posture). In the MOSAIC model, modules 
of “controllers” for motor behavior account for some number of 
potential contexts. When the motor context is realized, the appro-
priate control is implemented. Thus, once context is realized, we can 
modify our movements based on existing modular states. Similarly, 
the vast array of tools and objects (and the possible interactions 
between them) creates a tremendous number of potential contexts 
that would have to be learned. Here, when a tool is needed but 
unavailable, other known tools may be imported to replace the 
needed one to afford action.
Herein, we propose a Modular Selection for Action Goals 
(MSAG) model. While the MOSAIC model is focused at the con-
troller level and primarily describes the adaptive nature of senso-
rimotor control based on multiple pairs of forward and inverse 
models, we approach motor control from a more global level and 
propose a modular structure for the realization of action goals. In 
our model, an action goal is fixed (grounded), while the selection 
of an appropriate tool, context of use (of the tool), and neurobio-
mechanical parameters are contextually dependent on the action 
goal. A modular organization of tool/object action affords similar 
flexibility for rules in tool/object usage that allow deviation from 
established norms into new contexts, just as the MOSAIC model 
affords similar optimization of “situational” motor control. In this 
construct, once a tool is learned for a given task, that tool can 
be moved with relative ease in and out of possible contexts and 
become potentially “wired” to related/alternative tasks. In essence, a 
tool can be grounded to a particular sensorimotor and conceptual 
experience, while being embedded into a larger module accessible 
for many potential uses, which may or may not share similarities 
with past actions. Thus, we learn to use a knife to cut something in 
particular, then to cut in general, and, last, we extend the representa-
tion of a knife to a myriad of other potential uses (e.g., stir). This 
theory is represented in Figure 1. Three distinct modules are repre-
sented: a Tools Module, a Usage Contexts Module, and a Potential 
Neurobiomechanics Module. Each module provides unique infor-
mation to a controller, which then derives a motor plan for the 
execution of behavior. Here, an array of canonical and available tools 
is identified for a given action, along with the expected neurobio-
mechanics. In this array, the spoon is available and selected, paired 
suggesting a complex link between low-level visual structures and 
perception. Closer to the current topic, studies have shown that 
perceptual awareness of two objects is increased when the objects 
form a familiar tool–object action pair and are positioned, within 
a visual array, in a plausible way for action (Riddoch et al., 2003; 
Humphreys et al., 2006). More recently, Roberts and Humphreys 
(2010) observed specific activations of lateral occipital areas (e.g., 
early visual processing areas) for familiar objects positioned cor-
rectly for action as compared to those positioned incorrectly for 
action (Roberts and Humphreys, 2010). This object-orientation/
object-position effect seems to be independent of visual atten-
tion (Riggio et al., 2008), and suggests that low-level visual proc-
esses directly contribute to our understanding of action-related 
object features.
Higher-level visual representations of tools and objects have 
been the subject of study for many years, and the neural mecha-
nisms of tool identification and basic tool use are well known. 
Previous work has identified class-specific mechanisms of object 
recognition in the brain (Martin and Chao, 2001), and it is known 
that viewing tools activates inferior regions of the left intraparietal 
sulcus and ventral premotor cortex (Chao et al., 2002). Extensive 
tool-specific activation is also commonly seen in temporal regions 
(Beauchamp and Martin, 2007). Although commonly active in 
response to tool stimuli, there does appear to be some specializa-
tion in the type of information processed at these regions based on 
familiarity. Posterior parietal and premotor activation in response 
to tools may be specialized to convey information related to the 
motor affordance of a tool rather than its identity (Jeannerod et al., 
1995; Johnson-Frey, 2004), while posterior and inferior temporal 
activation seems to be of particular importance in tool identifica-
tion rather than understanding motoric qualities (Martin, 2007). 
Further, the anterior frontal regions, especially the ventrolateral 
aspect of the prefrontal cortex (Ranganath et al., 2004), are thought 
to form a network with regions of the temporal cortex (Mayes et al., 
2007) to mediate the semantic and associative memory used in 
object representations (Martin, 2007). This concept is supported 
by lesion studies, which have shown that disrupted communication 
between the prefrontal and temporal regions impairs the recall of 
visual associative information (Tomita et al., 1999). As such, spe-
cialized mechanisms seem to link the identification of manipulable 
objects with information about the actions and context associated 
with their use, an idea that is well supported by previous literature. 
Grounding of action associated with a tool should engage extensive 
areas that affect perception. This infers that a strong test of tool 
grounding is more action based, and should be reflected in low 
and high level visual areas.
modifyinG what’s Grounded
In regards to the second question (modifying already grounded 
tools/objects/action), this speaks to a consideration that the parieto-
temporo-frontal system related to tool action is very plastic. In this 
construct, new functions are attributed to existing tools or a task 
action is learned using a new set of tools. Such learning is typical 
of our daily lives, as rarely do we use a tool in only the capacity in 
which we have learned it. Routinely, tools are used to accomplish 
a task by the nature of basic aspects that the tool can afford. Here, 
if one needs to stir paint in absence of a paint stirrer, objects can 
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a current image bears similarities with a previous one (Myung 
et al., 2006). Similarly, behavioral evidence would also suggest that 
action can be afforded when presented with a superordinate cat-
egory by way of activating a myriad of potential actions related 
to that category (Heit and Barsalou, 1996; Borghi and Caramelli, 
2003; Marques, 2006). This last evidence may be important to the 
MSAG theory of defining novel tool uses (of familiar tools) for 
an action.
So, consider if a tool is desired but not available (e.g., Figure 2; no 
spoons or stirrers). Seeking the desired tool may, in effect, “prime” 
a supraordinate class of tools that are the best-fit plausible alterna-
tives, if any are available. Here, eye glasses may not be primed, but 
with the motoric demands of the action for successful accomplish-
ment. As will be discussed later (Section “Relevance in Apraxia”) 
the modular organization of MSAG helps to tentatively explain 
unique aspects of tool action impairment.
Existing theories of the structure of the encoding of tools/objects 
may afford this. The proposed “superordinate” representations of 
tool knowledge relate to how we categorize tools/objects etc. around 
themes. Superordinate classes of tools may reflect an organization 
that allows us to group things based on similarities, which may be 
functional (Murphy and Wisniewski, 1989), and has been used 
to address developmental theories (see next section). Behavioral 
evidence indicates that there is a potentiating of judgment when 
FIgure 1 | Proposed MSAg model of tool, neurobiomechanical, and action representations for driving appropriate tool–object behaviors. In this example, 
canonical tools are available and spoon is selected for achieving the action goal of stirring coffee.
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may require more than just one exposure. Under MSAG for tool 
selection and action, the “plasticity” of tools for many potential 
tasks is optimized.
It is important to emphasize that we are not fully regarding the 
MSAG model to tool–hand action alone (i.e., kinematic strate-
gies for hammers of different weights). Much previous work has 
identified a potential role for the MOSAIC model in this capacity 
(Wolpert and Kawato, 1998; Haruno et al., 2001; Imamizu et al., 
2003, 2007a,b; Imamizu and Kawato, 2009; Shah and Barto, 2009). 
This MSAG proposal extends our theory into conceptual tool use 
in variable situational states where a known tool takes on a “new” 
function. We will further advance theories related to MSAG into 
the knife would be (Figure 2) as it would be a part of a “utensil” 
supraordinate class. Once selected, the knife may become grounded 
for that new action upon use, while not impairing tool knowledge 
of the former action. Here, selection of knife is driven by functional 
similarity (e.g., used when eating) to the canonical (but unavail-
able) tool. Similarly, key to the MOSAIC model is that learning 
a new movement repertoire does not impede modules for other 
actions (Wolpert and Kawato, 1998). Further, interference from 
other potential usage contexts is avoided (slice, spread, chop), as 
they automatically do not meet the action goals (stir coffee). We 
highlight that at this stage, we are back to the first question, as 
actually grounding the “best-fit” alternative tool to a new action 
FIgure 2 | Proposed MSAg model of tool, neurobiomechanical, and action representations for driving appropriate tool–object behaviors. In this example, 
canonical tools are not available and the novel usage context of stir is applied to a best-fit-tool (knife) to achieve the action goal of stirring coffee.
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We will consider two types of apraxia in this new model: 
 ideomotor apraxia and conceptual apraxia. The first form, ideo-
motor apraxia, is commonly characterized by deficits in pantomime 
of tool use (i.e., demonstrating tool use without the actual tool). 
In this case, a patient is deficient at pantomiming tool usage out 
of context (e.g., “Show me how to use a hammer.”) (Wheaton and 
Hallett, 2007). The second form, conceptual apraxia, is manifest 
as the inability to select tools adequate for a task. Thus, selecting 
tools in task-driven ways is impaired though it is possible to retain 
functional knowledge of the tool even when removed from natural 
settings (Heilman et al., 1997). Here, appropriate knowledge of 
tools and objects for a given task may become disrupted.
If we consider the nature of performing a praxis motor task, say 
driving a nail, there are many potential solutions to the goal. These 
solutions vary based on a number of factors, including the exact tool 
used (e.g., hammer vs. other possible implements), neurobiome-
chanical constraints to human motion (e.g., kinetics and kinemat-
ics, neuromuscular synergies, etc.), and contextual parameters (e.g., 
roofing vs. a more delicate task). The neurologically intact person 
is capable of deriving an appropriate set of motor commands from 
the combination of all of these factors. We first identify that a ham-
mer is a “better” tool for driving a nail as compared to a shoe, for 
example. Then, we integrate the properties of the hammer with 
our sensorimotor system to develop and execute a motor plan, 
thus allowing us to drive the nail. Although seemingly automatic 
for many of us, patients with ideomotor and conceptual apraxia 
seem to show failures at different levels of this type of task.
In the case of ideomotor apraxia, there seems to be a disruption 
in translating the correctly identified tool (Figure 1, left side, many 
tools to one tool solution remains intact) into a single sensorimo-
tor control parameters set (resulting in a one tool – appropriate 
sensorimotor parameters failure). In this case, the MSAG controller 
may be given the correct tool-related input, yet these parameters fail 
to converge at an appropriate, single set of sensorimotor tool-task 
control parameters. For example, a patient may be able to identify 
a fork as the most appropriate tool to eat a meal, but is unable to 
derive the neurobiomechanical control strategy to utilize the fork in 
the correct manner. In this framework, ideomotor apraxia is related 
to a disruption of the input or output of the Neurobiomechanical 
Module on the right side of Figure 1, while the Available Tools 
Module (left side of Figure 1) functions normally.
Conceptual apraxia, however, seems to be a disruption of the 
opposite phenomenon. There is a failure in deriving the many tools 
to one tool solution, yet the one tool – appropriate sensorimotor 
parameters solution is intact. Interestingly, here the MSAG control-
ler may be given faulty tool-related information, yet appropriate 
tool-task sensorimotor control parameters are often realized which 
results in successful motoric (although contextually incorrect) use 
of a tool to achieve the desired behavior. For example, a patient may 
be able to successfully eat a meal using a toothbrush instead of a 
fork. In our proposed framework, conceptual apraxia is related to 
a disruption of the Available Tools Module (left side of Figure 1), 
while the Neurobiomechanical Module (right side of Figure 1) 
functions normally based on the action goals.
According to MSAG, the detriments in apraxia are based on sep-
arately damaged modules. Hence, a modular organization of MSAG 
is plausible. Thus, tool selection module fails in conceptual apraxia, 
the neurological disorder of apraxia (see Section “Relevance in 
Apraxia”), offering a potential mechanistic description of deficits 
common to motor and conceptual apraxias.
ideas from develoPmental studies
Adolescent behavioral neuroscience literature offers insight into the 
development of tool/object/action representations. Behavioral stud-
ies have demonstrated the development of functional associations 
between items in the formation of concepts related to manipulation 
knowledge (Kalenine and Bonthoux, 2008). Further, action prim-
ing is shown to enable object recognition (Mounoud et al., 2007). 
Particularly at a young age, knowledge of tool-based relationships 
is critical above more abstract, categorical relationship knowledge 
(Perraudin and Mounoud, 2009). Age plays a dramatic role in estab-
lishing how we categorize objects, where at very young ages (7 years 
old) object categorization is best at a basic level than at a superor-
dinate level, which is no longer noticeable by age 9 (Kalenine et al., 
2009a). Even infants display basic categorizations of visually pre-
sented objects at anterior–posterior brain areas (Grossmann et al., 
2009). In keeping with this evidence, it is suggested that learning 
categories of tools and objects based on a mutual sense of action 
between the two is possible (Gershkoff-Stowe and Rakison, 2005; 
Smith, 2005) and may reflect similar, ongoing process in adulthood. 
Observational-based tool learning is robust in children (Hopper 
et al., 2010), though with age this capability likely introduces more 
motor error than necessary (McGuigan et al., 2010) and is suggestive 
of a need for sensorimotor experience for learning. Nevertheless, 
these developmental data represent a basis that the acquisition of 
tool concepts is heavily related to binding with objects or action. 
Thus, a spoon is a type of item that matches other spoons (belongs to 
a class of spoons based on structural characteristics), but is also asso-
ciated with bowls (based on functional characteristics). Interestingly, 
knowledge that “spoon” is a member of the larger class of “utensil” 
requires more time. Evidence in adults suggests that such catego-
rization knowledge of tool with a functional unit is represented, as 
expected, in pareito-temporal areas that have a high correspondence 
to action knowledge areas (Kalenine et al., 2009b). Thus, to learn 
new tool/object/action representations, or particularly in modifying 
existing ones, we heavily utilize pre- established, grounded concepts. 
The advantage of this concept would be in using existing templates 
that can be modified over time (see Section “Modifying What’s 
Grounded”). To our knowledge this is still speculative, although fur-
ther work considering developmental models may provide greater 
insight into the mechanisms of formation, storage, and modification 
of tool/object representations.
relevanCe in aPraxia
Of interest to the theory of grounded cognition (relevant to tool 
use) is apraxia. Apraxia is a deficit commonly arising after stroke 
that will impair tool-related behavior. This can include perform-
ance of tool movements, selection and ordering of tools for a task, 
and the general understanding of tools. Apraxia also extends to 
communicative gesture impairments, though we will not consider 
this feature in the current discussion. Here, we will focus on two 
forms of apraxia to highlight the implications of grounded cog-
nition in explaining apraxia-related deficits, and we will offer an 
alternative theory based on the MSAG model.
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when considering whether and how something is “grounded.” 
The main issue we hope to make clear is in the essentials of 
plasticity of the system. That is, how flexible are the functional 
representations of grounded tool/object/action to multiple vari-
ables (e.g., environment)? To make the point clear, we rely on 
our previous example of Figure 2, stirring coffee. If you need 
to prepare coffee but no stirrers or spoons are readily available, 
what do you do? In strict form, you may only have two alterna-
tives (spoon or stirrer) with which to complete the action based 
on your sensorimotor history. Their absence would end in a 
“fault” and thus you would not be able to prepare your coffee. 
However, we know that other stirrer-like or spoon-like objects 
may be available which can be used in the place of a spoon 
or stirrer, and so we are able to advance and finish preparing 
our coffee. These alternatives may exist based on functional or 
structural similarity.
This adaptability presents a computational challenge to our 
neural architecture. How can we have nearly limitless adaptability 
of committing an act regardless of setting and the most basic tools 
at hand? While behaviorally robust, the neural representation of 
this is worth understanding. We propose a modular organization 
(MSAG) of tool/object ordinates as a method to accomplish the 
goal of importing and applying tools/objects in variable action 
states which afford for the plasticity of tool/object based deci-
sions for action, and also utilize MOSAIC-like principles for 
tool-related motor behavior. Although seemingly oxymoronic 
at first, we propose this “plasticity” of grounded elements is an 
essential characteristic. Our neural systems for tool use must 
have the powerful ability to adapt, incorporating new acts and 
goals of various tools and objects into our motor repertoire. 
Such a system would strengthen our ability to map familiar tools 
to new actions, and afford importing new tools into the same 
neural architecture.
This proposal stems from the theory of ad hoc categorization 
(Barsalou, 1983) and is supported by recent literature in grounded 
and embodied cognition. It has been proposed that a “strong” and 
“weak” version of embodiment exists, with the latter described as a 
form of “graded” grounding (Chatterjee, 2010). Chatterjee (2010) 
goes further to suggest that “Referring to graded grounding invites 
consideration of continua and trade-offs between what is lost and 
what is gained. Representations by virtue of being less grounded 
in sensory and motor details lose some of their referential power. 
But, by virtue of being less grounded they also gain generative 
and flexible power.” Other evidence specifically suggests that a dis-
tributed brain network abstracts action representations away from 
actors (Kable and Chatterjee, 2006), thereby diminishing sensory 
and motor details of specific actors and objects and allowing for 
relational plasticity. Our model is in agreement with this “graded 
grounding” conceptual approach, where tool–object relational 
processing may be removed from strict sensorimotor grounding 
and instead be governed by the context-dependent abstracted (e.g., 
ad hoc) category “Action Goal.” Here, the original tool and object 
percepts remain intact, yet novel, context-driven relational inter-
actions can form. In keeping with our knife-stir example, a knife 
is capable of adopting the function of a stirring implement with 
respect to a cup of coffee, yet the knife remains a knife (e.g., it is 
not perceived as a spoon).
while the tool action module fails in ideomotor apraxia. At the 
same time, the tool action module survives in conceptual apraxia 
while the tool selection module survives in ideomotor apraxia. 
Lesion profiles for the two types of apraxia potentially support 
this notion of multiple modules, as primary damage to left pari-
etofrontal regions is seen in ideomotor apraxia, while conceptual 
apraxia tends to result from bilateral damage to temporoparietal 
areas (Heilman and Gonzalez Rothi, 2003).
aGinG
Aside from apraxia, evidence suggests specific processes related to 
tool knowledge may be affected by aging. It is important to note that 
these studies identify praxis impairments in a non-neuropatholog-
ical aging population. Early work into the effect of healthy aging 
on praxis function revealed age-specific reductions in performance 
of pantomimes executed to verbal command. In healthy subjects, 
Ska and Nespoulous (1987) evaluated self-oriented (e.g., brushing 
the teeth) and external (e.g., tearing a piece of paper) pantomimes. 
One-handed repetitive and non-repetitive pantomimes were most 
affected, where older subjects often committed Body Part as Object 
(BPO) errors (e.g., instead of shaping the hand as if to use the absent 
object, the hand becomes the acting object).
More recently, Rodrigues Cavalcante and Caramelli (2009) 
evaluated gesture production to verbal command and imitation 
in healthy older subjects. As before, older subjects showed reduced 
performance of pantomime to verbal command, primarily due to 
commission of BPO errors. Further, Mozaz et al. (2010) evaluated 
arm–hand postural knowledge of tool use and communicative 
gestures in healthy older adults. Although knowledge related to 
both types of postures were reduced at a similar rate with increas-
ing age, tool-related knowledge showed greater overall declines. 
This is in line with previous reports also suggesting dissociations 
between tool use and communicative gestures in apraxia (Bartolo 
et al., 2001; Villarreal et al., 2008; Bohlhalter et al., 2009). Mozaz 
et al. (2009) went further to suggest that loss of tool-use postural 
knowledge was unrelated to deficits in basic visual function, asso-
ciative agnosia or semantic processing, but may be accounted for 
by the domain-specific representational hypothesis (Buxbaum and 
Kalenine, 2010). Evidence does not suggest that older subjects have 
“apraxia” per se, but that domain-specific processes are impaired 
in these subjects similar to stroke patients with apraxia, where 
tool-use knowledge is largely affected. Hence, aging may play a 
role in the grounded tool knowledge state. The mechanisms of 
what is changing are of importance and have a high relevance to 
understanding neural disease states common in advancing age. As 
well, it is clear that normal aging alters many neuroanatomical, 
cognitive and physiological brain processes (Lu et al., 2002; Davis 
et al., 2009; Hutton et al., 2009; Park and Reuter-Lorenz, 2009; Zahr 
et al., 2009) which may affect the neural architecture and func-
tion of the grounded cognition model as well. Adjustments under 
advancing age may represent another aspect of essential plasticity 
of tool knowledge states.
are we for, or aGainst, Grounded CoGnition?
This section is of importance to correctly represent the above 
discussion. We do not feel that the grounded theory is invalid, 
but that there are challenging issues that must be addressed 
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ConClusions and summary
While an appealing notion, the mechanism of grounded cognition 
in tool use still remains an unclear. Of note, we demonstrate two 
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Points for further refinement
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structure of tools/objects to actions.
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